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Margaret Jane Radin has been among our more perceptive observers of the
previously unseen, a loyal legal pragmatist whose curiosity and commitment to the
importance of ideas have led her to contribute important critiques of prevailing
orthodoxy.2 In recent years she has been a critic of the evolving culture of high
technology and, of central significance in this essay, she has been concerned with its
impact on ideas about law and sovereignty. This was the topic of a stimulating talk
she delivered here last spring, on which her piece in this Symposium is based and
around which the Symposium is built,3 and during that time we also had the pleasure
of her urbane wit within our halls for a few days. I wanted to begin with that in mind
because, while this essay is critical in tone, it is very much in the spirit of
constructive feedback and therefore it is sincere academic flattery. If anything, this
essay shows that the problem I want to talk about is an endemic one, as I believe it is
present even in the work of a writer who has been very careful and perceptive.
Specifically, though she has never made it her central concern, and though in her
occasional comments on it she has had interesting things to say, I think a sore spot in
Professor Radin=s work is her refusal directly to ask whether, as a jurisprudential
proposition, there is any meaningful difference between the “public” and the
“private.” I believe this distinction is both highly problematic and (though I think
she might deny it) of central importance to her work. As I will explain, it appears in
various ways throughout the different veins of her work, sometimes more visibly
than others. Though it is quite muted, it not only appears in her piece in this
Symposium, but I think it happens to appear there in a way that will be very telling
and important.

1

Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. I welcome all comments at
csagers@law.csuohio.edu. Special thanks to Peggy Radin, who read the manuscript and gave
very useful feedback, and as well for her generous permission to cite unpublished sources.
2

She is, after all, a descendant of the legal realist Max Radin. A little known fact.

3

Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (2006) [hereinafter Radin, Comment].
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To be sure, if it affects her work it is probably only because it affects everyone=s
work, as it is so thorny and ingrained that it seems almost impossible to conceive of
social issues without it. Thus, what is now a very old conceptual problem, which
became central to understanding Western history as long ago as the late Middle
Ages, still remains quietly fundamental. We still struggle, for example, to define the
state=s proper role in structuring family and sexual relationships in our ongoing
American Kulturkampf.4 Criticism of the distinction is likewise hardly new; in the
main my arguments below will be similar to arguments of Morris Cohen, Robert
Hale, and others made many years ago.5 Still it is one that seems continually worth
making, as it is repeatedly forgotten. As Radin herself has said, the distinction=s
pernicious flaws must be continually re-discovered because they are so easily
obscured by “the persistent mythological force of laissez-faire ideology in our
culture”6
In any case, this also happens to be quite an opportune moment to consider the
problem. It is tempting just now to believe that American legal scholarship is on the
verge of some watershed moment or paradigm shift (though such moments have
come and gone before, leaving behind them a remarkable underlying continuity in
our discipline), and the excitement seems especially to center on concern for
phenomena that bring into question our understanding of the nature of “law.”
Concern for non-state-but-law-like phenomena has become routine enough that it is
now virtually commonplace to say things like the following, as a matter that may be
taken for granted: “People=s behavior is subject to many different kinds of
constraints, of which law is only one.”7 Implying that law is not especially different
from other constraints may never have been all that shocking outside the legal
academy,8 but among lawyers it is, or at least it used to be B among we who have

4

A word recently made familiar to Americans in the most apropos of circumstances; see
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing, in disagreeing
with the Court=s holding that state constitutional ban on “special” treatment of homosexuals
deprived them of federal equal protection rights, that “[t]he Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf
for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a
>bare . . . desire to harm= homosexuals . . . , but is rather a modest attempt . . . to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those
mores through use of the laws”).
5

See infra note 15 and accompanying text.

6

Margaret Jane Radin, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in
Cyberspace, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1295 (1998).
7

James Grimmelman, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L. J. 1719, 1724 (2005);
see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85-99 (1999) (arguing
that essentially equivalent “regulatory” effects can follow from law, norms, markets, and
“architecture,” the latter meaning technological constraints of various kinds that limit the
subject=s available range of choices).
8
See, e.g., Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism, in
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 143, 149 (Walter W. Powell &
Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. 1991) (urging a very broad and inclusive definition of “institution” for
use among social scientists, a definition that would include government regulatory gestures
along with a range of less formal patterns or orders of social reproduction; namely,
“institutions are socially constructed, routine-reproduced . . . program or rule systems. They
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spent generations arguing about what “law” is and why it is different from other
things. In any case, whether it is especially new or not,9 this recent interest has
found expression in quite a range of legal schools of thought, which seem to be
increasingly aware of each other just now and keen to know whether together they
make a “movement” Thus, we have seen flourishing work in “voluntary
associations,”10 a legal literature on “norms,”11 the older but still thriving tradition
concerning “private ordering,”12 the recently booming literature on “privatization” or
“the new governance,”13 and the so-called “New Legal Realism,”14 which seems
aptly named, as its concern for private influence echoes the work of the “old”

operate as relative fixtures of constraining environments and are accompanied by taken-forgranted accounts”).
9

A skepticism for public-private dichotomies has surfaced elsewhere in the human
sciences recently, and it has been suggested that it reflects the general distrust for grand theory
we=ve seen throughout the academy in the past few decades. See, e.g., Giorgio Chittolini, The
“Private,” the “Public,” the State, 67 J. MOD. HIST.: SUPPL. S34, S59 (1995). Skepticism for
grand theory seems historically cyclical, at least in modern times.
10

In the legal literature, most of this work is to the effect that private groups, like families,
social clubs, and churches, perform a function of such purely social significance in society that
they should be understood as essentially governmental or sovereign. Its thrust is that these
groups are fundamental to individual freedom and actualization and therefore deserve special
legal status. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private
Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144 (2003); Franklin G. Snyder, Sharing Sovereignty: NonState Associations and the Limits of State Power, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 365 (2004); Robert K.
Vischer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 949 (2004).
11
See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
12

“Private ordering” is an old and varied tradition. It has roots both in the University of
Wisconsin law-and-society tradition and in law-and-economics thinking rooted in Coase. In
any case, interest in these matters remains lively. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, Regulation by
Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179; Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering
in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Johnathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering
and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (1997);
Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of
Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004); Barak D. Richman, Community
Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, Harvard John
M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 384 (2002); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 319 (2002); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The
Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
13

Discussed at length in Chris Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Sagers, Myth].
14
See, e.g., Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of
Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 WISC.
L. REV. 479 (discussing emergence of purportedly new and rising schools of thought).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006

3

222

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:219

realists.15 More to the point of this essay, the huge legal literature on high
technology, mass communications, and the internet has been especially focused on
the peculiar jurisprudential problems they seem to pose concerning the nature of law,
and their tendency to blur the boundaries of “sovereignty.”16 Professor Radin has
15

Finding particular voice in the work of Robert Hale. See BARBARA FRIED, THE
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND
ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (2001) (in essence an intellectual biography, situating Hale=s life and
work in the politics of Progressive economics and legal academia). Morris Cohen, though
perhaps not well described as a realist himself, see JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 20, 74 (1995) (noting Cohen=s critical stance toward
the realists), expressed a similar view that was influential in the Progressive years. See, e.g.,
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 12 (1927) (arguing that
“property” by its nature gives some power to its holder; “To the extent that [property I own is]
necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me a power, limited but real, to
make him do what I want”).
16

This literature is now quite large. Of course, a body of work exists that asks how various
more or less mundane questions of doctrine should be handled in the allegedly unique
circumstances of computer technology and mass communication, like how antitrust should
apply to the software industry. See, e.g., Symposium, The Interface Between Intellectual
Property Law and Antitrust Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1695 (2003).
But this technology has also spurred a range of peculiar, intriguing and very basic
jurisprudential issues, often going to the core of our political philosophy. Even the seemingly
mundane issue of personal jurisdiction led to metaphysical speculation about what
“cyberspace” really is—or, as commenters frequently asked the question, where it is. This in
turn raised basic questions of sovereignty and freedom. A leading early article in this vein
was David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders B The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (emphasizing the borderless nature of “cyberspace” and arguing
that territorially defined sovereigns are poorly situated to regulate it; arguing that it should be
understood as independent of all territorial sovereignties and subject to a self-governing set of
norms, to be analogous to the “law merchant”).
More to the point here, some technological and commercial aspects of recent high
technology have brought into question the nature of “law” and have suggested that in many
respects various technologies and various commercial behaviors are supplanting traditional
sovereignty. Commentators have argued that the involvement of traditional government in
technology sectors has often been undesirable, see, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in
Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L. J. 17
(2000), and they have predicted that private cooperation will have some large role in ordering
cyberspace, see, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical
Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003) (describing the rise and influence of the
privately organized Internet Engineering Task Force); Johnson & Post, supra. There also has
been much talk to the effect that some contracting practices apportion power of a regulatory
kind to technology producers. This especially is said to be true of new approaches to the
licensing of software, both in durable media and online, over which much controversy has
raged. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1239 (1995) (arguing that “shrink-wrap” licenses pose threat of rendering intellectual
property policy obsolete, and significantly expanding manufacturers= property rights; urging
that this not be allowed to happen).
A separate but related area of inquiry has concerned the seemingly regulatory effect of
software code itself. Lawrence Lessig has been the most visible exponent on this point, his
most lengthy expression being LESSIG, supra note 7. His view is that software is
“architectural” insofar as it limits its subjects= possible range of choices, and therefore
constrains conduct in a “regulatory” manner. See id. at 30-42. Both a summary of the
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been a visible participant in this literature and her piece in this Symposium is a
contribution to it.17 I think it is in this context perhaps more than anywhere that she
comes into close proximity with the public-private distinction, though as I will try to
show I think it plays a large role in her work generally, even though it is not always
easy to see. My purpose here is to urge her finally to go all the way and consider
whether the distinction is really desirable or necessary (or at least consider what it
would mean were we to try to reconceive it).
This essay begins by situating the distinction in history generally and in
American legal thought. Its historical aspect seems important because it suggests
that the distinction is not predetermined—it is historically and culturally contingent.
That fact has been largely ignored in the American legal academy, and among most
of the judiciary it is all but outright socialist treachery to suggest it. The essay moves
on to consider Radin=s work itself. The prominence of the distinction is relatively
obvious in some of her work on technological marketing and design issues, but I will
suggest that in fact it runs quietly just beneath the surface of all of her work.
An important piece of this discussion will be to address the general philosophical
stance Professor Radin has taken throughout her career—what she has described as
her “Deweyan pragmatism.” I expect she will say that much of my critique is off the
mark for failure to understand the pragmatic perspective. In fact, I fear that
grappling with any specific problem in Radin=s work threatens to become a grappling
with her pragmatism, because the pragmatist will say that my critique is a
generalizing one—it attacks a general principle—whereas pragmatists ask questions
only on a case-by-case basis, and have neither faith nor concern for arguments made
in the abstract. I hope to avoid that as much as possible. Therefore I will do my best
to take Radin=s pragmatism at its word, understanding it only according to what she
has said about it, and presume it to be uncontroversial—as I expect Radin would put
it, I will “bracket” all such matters—and focus only on the specific question of the
public-private distinction. I do this in part because, with due respect, “pragmatism”
is so loose and slippery that to confront it directly is to invite inevitable (and in this
case, I think, unhelpfully distracting) digressions about what pragmatism is and what
the particular pragmatist did or did not say about it at some point in the past.18 But
literature in this latter area and an original contribution to it appear in an exceptional student
note in the Yale Law Journal. See Grimmelman, supra note 7.
17

See Radin, Comment, supra note 3. Her other contributions to the literature appear in
MARGARET JANE RADIN ET AL., INTERNET COMMERCE: THE EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
(2d ed. 2006); Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and
Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002) [hereinafter Radin, Online Standardization];
Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L. J. 1125
(1999) [hereinafter Radin, Humans, Computers]; and Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by
Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. THEORETICAL & INST. ECON. 1 (2004) [hereinafter
Radin, Regulation by Contract].
18

A frequently noticed problem is pragmatism=s refusal (or inability) to define itself, a task
that might imply a foundationalism at odds with pragmatism=s own affinity for the practical
and case-by-case. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L. J. 409, 41011 (1990) (noting the difficulty of discovering “what legal pragmatism is”); Michael Sullivan
& Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism,
113 YALE L. J. 687, 688 & n.11 (2003) (noting the hesitance of classical pragmatists “to insist
on necessary and sufficient conditions for calling something a pragmatic theory,” a step that
would “risk converting it into the very positions it seeks to repudiate”); cf. Margaret Jane
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this is also a matter of simple fairness and an effort not to be misunderstood as
making criticisms I do not intend.19 In that spirit, it is only fair to add that both
Radin=s pragmatism and her views on public-private must be pieced together from
writings scattered across twenty-five years of work. My rendition of it therefore will
be at best a bric-a-bac rather than a living and evolving system of thought. It is only
“[a] static interpretation [that] reads an author=s later work in light of theories or
conceptions laid down in her earlier work,”20 though I fear it is also the best I can do.
Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1705 (1990) [hereinafter
Radin, Pragmatist and Feminist] (noting that there is not one pragmatism but “a number of
pragmatisms”).
A related problem and one that will play a role in this essay is that it is logically tricky to
remain true to pragmatism=s evident anti-foundationalism while also offering constructive
critique or holding normative convictions. Therefore it can be very hard to pin down just what
the pragmatist stands for, and though Radin and other pragmatists deny it (and I also doubt it
very much), the movement=s critics have long said the philosophy is “banal” See Sullivan &
Solove, supra, at 687-88 (collecting statements to this effect from pragmatists and their critics,
though arguing ultimately that pragmatism is politically “radical”); cf. Smith, supra, at 424
(“Ironically, [because pragmatism on at least one feasible reading is merely truistic], a position
that has insisted that an idea is true only to the extent that it is useful would be convicted under
its own standard”).
Indeed, more dramatically, the movement=s critics sometimes argue that pragmatism is
really no philosophy at all. As Steven Smith wrote in a careful, perceptive article written
during the much-discussed “renaissance” of “legal” pragmatism in the 1980s and 1990s, the
pragmatist faces an apparent internal logic problem in that “[p]ragmatists dislike and distrust
theory. Pragmatists also like and need theory.” Smith, supra, at 429. Because the pragmatic
effort to avoid this tension gets so much of its rhetorical power from the mere “incantatory
repetition of sacred words—‘experience,’ ‘context,’ ‘perspective,’ ‘dialogue,’ “id. at 440—it
ultimately boils down to nothing more than exhortation to use “the method, explained
gravely,[,] [of] [c]areful, correct thinking.” Id. at 437. As he then says, this seemingly truistic
nature renders pragmatism “not too good to be true,” but “too true to be good.” Id. at 424.
I believe that all these points are relevant because part of the problem in grappling with
pragmatism is that most pragmatists= efforts to explain away these conflicts render the
philosophy very slippery and hard to pin down.
19

Thus, I hope Professor Radin agrees that we seem to be “kindred spirits,” a fact she
thinks some previous critics have ignored, and that I will not be misunderstood as accusing her
of an “implicit conservatism.” While I believe there is a problem in her approach, and that it
tends unnecessarily to give received wisdoms the benefit of the doubt, I have no doubt that in
her personal politics she is not “conservative.” Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a
Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45 STAN. L. REV. 409, 409 (1993) (responding to
Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin=s Theory of Property
and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1992) [hereinafter Radin, Transformative]).
Likewise, while I actually am sympathetic to at least one of Schnably=s points B that the caseby-case, piecemeal “pragmatic” approach to legal problems, at least so long as it tends to
focus on specific doctrinal questions, “will most likely amount to no more than tinkering or
[worse yet,] stabilizing reform,” Schnably, supra, at 382 B I hope nothing here will be
mistaken as demanding some totalizing “theory of transformative social change” or a “total
revolution.” Id. at 410.
Incidentally, if I understand her correctly, Professor Radin has not entirely denied the
problem of pragmatism=s conservative potential. See, e.g., Radin, Pragmatist and Feminist,
supra note 18, at 1710-11 (discussing the problem of pragmatist “bad coherence” and the risk
that pragmatism tends to preserve values whether they are “good” or not).
20

Radin, Transformative, supra note 19, at 422.
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Ultimately, in any case, the heart of the essay is in Part III. There I will take the
distinction head on, address Professor Radin=s approach to it, and suggest why it is
an important problem in her work. Namely, the distinction is more than just a
semantic peculiarity of significance only in judicial opinions. It plays a quietly
profound legitimating function in society, effectively obscuring maldistributions of
power of very great significance to the lives of human individuals, and therefore
goes to what I believe has been the core of Professor Radin=s work throughout her
career.
I. HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PREDICATES; TREATMENT OF THE DISTINCTION IN
THE CASES AND IN THE LITERATURE
The history of the distinction in Western thought is surprising and intriguing.
While this may not be the place for long digression on its anthropology or history, an
important point should be made about it. Given our current popular institutions and
the cultural legacy of two centuries of liberal democracy, it is quite difficult even to
think about society without some fairly sharp conceptual divide at least between the
“individual” and the “state,” and for most Americans it is also second nature to
perceive some fairly large range of association activity that is distinct from the
“state.” Thus it seems undeniable that some distinction between “public” and
“private” is in some way metaphysically real and contingent on neither time nor
culture. But, as it turns out, that is apparently not so. The distinction=s origin is both
surprisingly recent and intimately tied up with the rapidly changing nature of the
“self.”
While in some very general sense the perceived difference between “state” and
“non-state” is ancient,21 the modern concept of a public-private divide—a
jurisprudential proposition of a metaphysically real division between the public and
private spheres, the chief political ideal of which being the primacy of individual
human autonomy—did not surface in Western culture until the late Middle Ages,
during which there not coincidentally arose the first embryonic beginnings of the
modern nation-state. The distinction did not become a significant aspect of Western
political thinking until later, some time around the close of the seventeenth century.22
Moreover, though the two are routinely and casually confused, the “private” is
definitely not the same as the “individual.”23 That is, while enthusiastic defense of
“liberty” against central authority—the distinction between “us” and “the
government”—is old (as old in this country as European colonization), the liberal,
acquisitive individualism that became our routine self-definition is actually
comparatively new, culminating only some time around the turn of the nineteenth
21
See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 2-6 (4th ed.
2004) (noting origins of the >public law/private law= distinction in the Code of Justinian).
22

See generally Philippe Ariès, Introduction, in 3 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: PASSIONS
RENAISSANCE 1-9 (Roger Chartier, ed., Arthur Goldhammer, trans. 1989); Chittolini,
supra note 9, at S34; Dena Goodman, Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of
Current Historiographical Approaches to the Old Regime, 31 HIST. & THEORY 1 (1992).
OF THE

23

Often they are confused because it happens to be politically convenient for some persons
nowadays to associate their own individualism with that which allegedly characterized the
founding generation. See BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE
PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1994) (discussing this trend).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006

7

226

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:219

century.24 This transition seems to have happened differently in different cultures,25
but it resulted in literally a change in the social construction of the self,26 and
accordingly in a changed vision of the relation of the individual, society, and the
state.
None of this is to deny that the idea of the distinction has some “reality,” as a
psychological or phenomenological matter; that is, the practice of believing in the
distinction is a phenomenon that seems real and may be of interest to the human
sciences. The point is merely that the distinction is not biologically predetermined
and it does not otherwise reflect some prior ordering of nature. Of course, that
proves neither that the distinction is “bad” nor that it is in some way conceptually
unnecessary under the conditions of our time. Rather, it is open to critique and
perhaps in some way or other it could be diminished or dispensed with if in fact it is
“bad”
In contemporary thinking there are commonly perceived to be at least two publicprivate divides, and they are seen as fairly different things.27 First, there exists a
sphere of associational activity, giving rise to what might be thought of as
organizational or juridical entities, which may be highly informal or which may be
more or less formal and bureaucratic, but which are not thought to be the “state.”
We might call this the sphere of private “enterprise,” though obviously it is not
meant to connote only private commercial business. Along with businesses, we
24

Historiographical debate has raged recently over whether the founding generation in the
United States was genuinely individualistic in this sense, and it is said that in fact they held
“republican” or some other generally communal views up until the turn of the 19th century.
Explanations vary for founding-era communalism, centering mainly on the philosophical
predilections of the founding elites, see, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975), or the
religion of the mass of Americans, see SHAIN, supra note 23. No serious disagreement exists,
however, that sometime in the early 19th century American political desiderata turned
predominantly individualist and liberal in nature, and that we have never as a people turned
back.
25

In France, for example, it was violent: it has been said that the change began as a royal
concession to violent religious conflict and was intended to protect the sovereignty from
revolution. Thus, so that there would not be war there came to be recognized a sphere of
freedom, debate and criticism which it was not the Crown=s to disturb. See Goodman, supra
note 22, at 2-8 (Goodman is actually critical of this view in its simple version, though as she
says it has been a standard one). In America, by contrast, the transition was not violent, and
rather accompanied the gradual decay of a colonial social paradigm. Traditionally, “liberty”
had been perceived not as a range of uninhibited individual choice, but as the freedom to live a
morally pure life, a life made possible by the freedom of local communities to self-determine
morally. Thus, as the transition of the “self” progressed in America, it was made possible by
the demise of intrusive, morally and culturally intolerant local community governance. See
SHAIN, supra note 23.
26

It is of no small significance to the arguments in this essay that this origin of the
contemporary self and individualism was associated with the rise of a literate middle-class and
the rise of widely distributed books—that is, this revolution of the self was to some degree a
bourgeois phenomenon, a phenomenon of a propertied class. See Goodman, supra note 22, at
11 & n.41. Cf. Part III, infra.
27

For a representative statement of this common, two-aspect view of public and private,
see MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (2002).
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would include non-profits, trade and professional associations, churches, clubs,
community organizations, and less formal “private” associations. Second, the family
is conceived as different from all other social entities. A basic difference arguably
separates “family” as private and “enterprise” as private—the family, however it
may differ in its particulars across time and from place to place, finds a seemingly
irreducible basis in the biological fact of reproduction; though family occasionally
includes persons not linked by blood or marriage, they are exceptions. (Perhaps
surprisingly, though, the nature of the family has also changed quite significantly
over time, and in American history the outer boundaries of the “household” have
been demonstrably in flux even quite recently.28)
As a jurisprudential proposition the distinction is fairly old, though as recently as
Blackstone we can see respects in which its popular understanding seems peculiar to
contemporary eyes.29 In contemporary American law the distinction is employed
most commonly as a way of saying just what the “government” is, since we
frequently recognize responsibilities and incidents of “government” that do not apply
to “non-government” entities. This legal proposition tends to be quite a formal one,
normally concerned exclusively with the legally defined boundaries of juridical
entities (“agencies,” “corporations,” “cities” and so on). It surfaces in basically this
contemporary form at least as early as the Marshall Court.30 Now ubiquitous in
28
See Barbara Laslett, The Family as a Public and Private Institution: An Historical
Perspective, 35 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 480 (1973).
29
The distinction is in full evidence in Blackstone; he divides his entire Commentaries into
the rights of persons, the rights of persons over things, and “public” and “private” wrongs
(meaning torts and crimes). See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 118 (Univ. of Chicago, facsimile ed. 1979) (1765). What seems peculiar is that
entities we now would reflexively call “public” often had seemingly “private” attributes. The
king, most notably, was a private individual as well as a corporate entity, see id. at 183, 457,
much of whose revenues—despite the fact that they constituted the very public fisc—were
conceived as merely the incidents of his privately held property rights. See id. at 271-96.
Likewise, entities we would call “private” routinely performed seemingly “public” functions.
Formal methods of association among tradesmen and entrepreneurs were known in English
law even at very ancient times, and they appear to have been fairly autonomous, but they also
played distinctly governmental, regulatory roles. Similarly, beginning especially in the 15th
century, the English Crown embarked on a number of major exploratory and regulatory efforts
by creating corporations, which frequently also attracted significant private investment. Large
areas of North America, for example, were under English rule for centuries under the
administration of royally chartered but privately managed corporations. See generally 1
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
2-6 (rev. ed. 1999).
30
It explicitly surfaces in U.S. constitutional law at least as early as 1819, when in Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), the Court held that the
state of New Hampshire could not interfere with the royally granted, pre-revolutionary
corporate charter of Dartmouth College, as such an interference would violate the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. What is interesting is that in the Court=s view this question
required an explicit public-private distinction, because if the Contracts Clause prohibited state
government interference with previously created “civil institutions” (like Dartmouth College,
if in fact it were a “public” corporation), then the Contracts Clause would seriously frustrate
state government administration. See id. at 627-30. This problem was averted, however,
because the Court found Dartmouth to be a “private” corporation.
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American legal doctrine,31 for many lawyers the distinction appears as a basic
component of our liberal democracy.32 While some jurists occasionally admit their
31

The distinction is most visible in constitutional contexts, where it surfaces in a wide
variety of situations. Its best known role is in the long, tortured, tiresome, and much criticized
series of “state action” cases, which necessarily ask whether some challenged conduct was
“public” (actionable for violation of constitutional rights) or “private” (not so actionable). Cf.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Forward B “State Action,” Equal
Protection, and California=s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (calling the state
action caselaw “a conceptual disaster area,” which “has the flavor of a torchless search for a
way out of a damp echoing cave”).
However, it turns up in a large range of other constitutional areas. See, e.g., Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (setting out a continuum of degrees of “privacy” within
“private” associations, ranging from the family (most private) to for-profit entities (least
private), to be used as a test for measuring the degree of a plaintiff=s First Amendment “right
of association” in a given context); Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005)
(deciding whether particular use of city=s eminent domain power was for a permissible
“public” purpose under Takings Clause); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533
U.S. 98, 115 (2001) (asking whether on-campus religious conduct violates First Amendment
by inquiring whether the conduct was genuinely that of the school or merely of the private
group, and whether community would be “confused” as to whether school endorsed Christian
religion); Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (noting in
dicta that tolerance of private speech endorsing religion is to be distinguished from
government speech endorsing it). For a long time it played a role in the rights of lawfully
resident aliens. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 437-39 (1982) (discussing history
of the distinction in this context; noting that governments could discriminate with respect to
public benefits, but could not “interven[e] in the private market” by restricting access to
private jobs).
Questions of public and private are raised in a variety of “private law” areas, in some of
which it is obvious B notably including family law. Likewise, though it is not much explicitly
discussed there, it is at the heart of property law, “ownership” being virtually a defining
boundary of “private-ness.” The distinction plays a surprising (and not much noticed) role in
antitrust law, perhaps reflecting its quasi-constitutional character as a basic gesture of social
organization. For example, courts have asked whether a defendant could be liable in antitrust
for harms seemingly “caused” by public entities. (The courts say “no.”) See Massachusetts
School of Law at Andover v. American Bar Assn., 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding
ABA immune from antitrust liability for its law school accreditation activities, on theory that
the “private” ABA had done no more than submit its opinion of plaintiff law school to state
governments). The Supreme Court has also sometimes shown a careful concern for the
special role of antitrust in defining the legal status of voluntary associations, and has sought to
keep it from making them seem like “public” ones. This fairly clearly explains, for example,
the result in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492 (1988), which refused
to hold that lobbying before a private, closed-door standard setting organization could be
legally equated to lobbying before a government (and therefore immunized from antitrust).
On a more subtle level it explains Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Coast
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), which refused to find that antitrust required
private voluntary trade organizations to adopt rules of due process.
The distinction arguably plays at least an atmospheric role in many other controversies
that seem quite far afield from the “public law” contexts in which it is obvious. Mass tort
liabilities for defective products raise the problem; on one view, they render the entrepreneur
an insurer of his fellow citizens, a redistribution of income by judicial fiat at odds with our
liberal democracy. Likewise, consider the Supreme Court=s rejection of an attempted “global”
class settlement of asbestos lawsuits. The settlement effectively would have used Civil
Procedure Rule 23 to set up a nationwide compensation scheme, which would constitute
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doubts of the distinction,33 even the rare open judicial disavowals of it tend to be,
apparently, not very serious.34
What seems most important about the distinction in legal thinking is the way in
which its notorious difficulty in application is acknowledged by virtually everyone,
but then assumed away. Even its critics often assume that, as with most hard legal
problems, it is really only hard in the penumbral cases, and not the core cases. Thus,
even in those comparatively rare areas in which the distinction has gotten attention
from legal academics,35 the focus has rarely been directly on the distinction itself or
the problems it causes. Concern rather is usually on particular issues of
constitutional or administrative doctrine, intellectual property, or the like.36 Thus,
when it is directly considered, most contemporary legal academics see the distinction
as approachable without too much difficulty on some heuristic basis or on common
sense.37
virtually a free-standing, contractually created regulatory agency to administer asbestos-injury
compensation claims. While sympathetic to the burdens of asbestos litigation the Court said
this: “The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing
regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of
asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.” Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
32
For example, this seems to explain Justice Rehnquist=s apparent belief in the “essential
dichotomy . . . between public and private acts . . . “Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
165 (1978) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)). One can
find similar sentiments among law professors. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law
Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N. C. L. REV. 397, 405 (2006)
(“Th[e] [public-private] line is fundamental—it ultimately distinguishes liberal society from
its despotic alternatives”).
33

See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra B Fourteen Years Later, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1289,1290-91(1982) (noting the distinction=s notorious doctrinal confusion
within the constitutional “state action” caselaw).
34
One is quite surprised, for example, to find such a disavowal by no less a devoted
conceptual formalist than Antonin Scalia. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 422
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a ruling that prison guards employed by a forprofit prison management firm do not enjoy “immunity” from '1983 suits as would
government employees; admitting that “I see no sense in the public-private distinction, [nor]
do I see what precisely it consists of”). Strangely, this dissent was joined by the Chief, who
some years earlier had proclaimed this distinction an “essential dichotomy.” See supra note
32.
35

Except in the area of state action doctrine, the distinction has tended to get
comparatively little explicit attention from legal academics. There are notable exceptions.
See, e.g., Symposium, The Public-Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
36

See Sagers, Myth, supra note 13 (discussing treatment of the distinction in the so-called
“privatization” literature).
37

See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in
Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1477, 1491 (2001) (urging application of constitutional and
administrative law rules by “[r]efusing to treat the public/private distinction as an either/or
discourse” because “[b]right lines between markets and regulation . . . [are] neither necessary
nor desirable”); cf. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 84-85, 198
(1989) (identifying the public-private split as a well-established “practical measure” to
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Another very interesting aspect of debate over the distinction as a legal
phenomenon is that it is politically ambiguous. Its critics normally take for granted
that it is of value only to their opponents,38 but that is quite false; the distinction
serves interests across the ideological spectrum. It is obviously important to
libertarians, who normally use it in defining their very position, and others
sympathetic to strong individualistic and/or marketplace values. But it is valuable to
the left as well, for a variety of reasons. It is seemingly necessary to defense of the
regulatory state and to critique of “private” wealth, as well as the protection of
private spheres of moral choice concerning issues such as marriage, sexual
orientation and reproduction. Generally, invocation of the distinction is a matter of
convenience driven by context.
II. MONISM, NOMINALISM AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE IN RADIN=S WORK
Before getting to Radin=s thoughts on the public-private distinction, a few
thoughts are in order about the metaphysical status of distinctions in legal practice
generally, and how she sees them. To some extent, my ideas on the public-private
divide reflect more general jurisprudential problems, and I believe Professor Radin
has offered thoughts on them that are important to address here.
A. Radin on Distinctions
To some very large extent, the game of doctrinal practice is a scholastically
metaphysical one. It is the practice of saying what some particular thing is, into
which legal category it belongs, and how it might differ from things in other legal
categories. Law, in other words, is distinctions. Logically immanent within this
game are epistemic and metaphysical claims about human capacity and attributes of
nature and justice. An aspect of the game that remains mysterious and which is not
logically entailed in the nature of the game itself is whether the announcing of
distinctions has a normative aspect.39 While it is not obviously bad if a legal
“distinguish public from private questions” and thereby to protect private institutions
important to personal life); Frank Michelman, Private Personal But Not Split: Radin versus
Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783, 1783-84 (1990) (discussing Rorty=s position). A fairly
common insight is that, while the distinction has no judicially administrable legal meaning, it
remains meaningful in understanding governance, and as a concept in political debate. See,
e.g., MINOW, supra note 27.
Occasionally, for various reasons, an author will urge that the distinction does not matter.
See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 324 n.25 (arguing that because his paper, dealing with
the legitimacy of “commercial private ordering,” considers only public perceptions of
legitimacy and not the actual location of regulatory power, he need not engage the distinction
itself).
38
See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz,. The History of the Public Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982) (arguing that the legal realists “expos[ed] the conservative
ideological foundations of the public/private distinction”). In his defense, Horwitz was
concerned mainly with the distinction as it developed in law in the 19th century, as opposed to
in society generally, but even there his characterization is unduly narrow and incautious.
39

I point this out here because it will play an important role in critique at the public-private
divide below.
Legal distinctions can be taken as containing propositions about the state of the natural
world, and those propositions may or may not be normative. From that perspective they might
be characterized as any of the following: (1) as purely positive B reflections of prior
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distinction has a normative motivation, it potentially compromises the distinction=s
accuracy as a sociological description (because it would be only a coincidence if a
distinction is both a true description and a politically desirable one) and introduces
the risk of politically biased rules.
Though she=s not often directly approached the question, Professor Radin appears
to have a particular stance on the philosophical problem of doctrinal distinctions, a
stance that follows from her general pragmatist=s approach to theory. First and
foremost, the pragmatist approaches all problems, including questions about whether
particular rules are good or bad, only in context.40 While it would be easy to think
that this demand for case-specific context requires rejection of all “theory,” based on
comments made by Radin and others,41 the pragmatist is apparently allowed to
indulge in it in some sense. Radin=s various defenses of “theory” appear to mean
both that pragmatists can coherently entertain visions of the ideal even while
working daily within non-ideal conditions42 and that they can approach individual
questions with a theoretical apparatus so long as that theory is grounded in the actual
doing of things being theorized. Thus, the pragmatist cannot answer particular
questions unless they are contextualized.43 While these two views seem in some
organization of nature, and therefore as value-neutral sociological description; (2) as both
positive and normative; or (3) as purely normative.
40
See, e g., Radin, Pragmatist and Feminist, supra note 18, at 1700 (pragmatists “must
look carefully at the nonideal circumstances in each case and decide which horn of the
dilemma is better (or less bad), and we must keep re-deciding as time goes on”).
41

See, e.g., id. at 1707 (noting that pragmatism is “a commitment against abstract idealism,
trancendence, foundationalism, and atemporal universality”); Smith, supra note 18, at 424 &
n.73 (discussing pragmatic stance toward “theory”).
42

Radin often says or implies that some kind of theory is possible and is desirable, or at
least inevitable. See, e.g., Radin, Transformative, supra note 19, at 413 (“A pragmatist does
not suppose, of course, that theory is never possible or that we can somehow do without it
altogether. Rather, theory is immanent and evolving; its development is interdependent with
practice. Visions of a better life are part of life; they give us the impetus to try to change
things. At the same time, those visions are constituted by life as it is now, and they will
change as we change our life and our world”); cf. Margaret Jane Radin, A Deweyan
Perspective on the Economic Theory of Democracy, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 539, 541 (1994)
[hereinafter Radin, Deweyan Perspective] (“Criticism of existing democratic government . . .
does not >touch the social and moral aspirations and ideas with underlie the . . . ideal.’ [W]e
should clarify and deepen our apprehension of the ideal, and use this deeper understanding to
‘criticize and remake its political manifestations.’”). Moreover, she says that theories, despite
their imperfections, “guide[] us.” Radin, Transformative, supra note 19, at 416 n.16.
43
As Radin frequently says, following Wittgenstein, the pragmatist disfavors abstract
answers to particular questions, and instead prefers to “look and see.” See, e.g., Radin,
Transformative, supra note 19, at 413 (“With respect to th[e] difficult question of how to
implement . . . ideal[s] in practice, . . . there is no algorithm that will tell us how to proceed.
We have to look and see, judging each particular case in context, deciding whether it will hurt
too much to try to put the ideal into practice now, and re-deciding the particular case when the
circumstances change”); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B. U. L.
REV. 781, 803 (1989) [hereinafter Radin, Rule of Law] (“[W]e [should not] hastily conclude
that because there is no such thing as traditional formal realizability [of rules], everything is
indeterminate or up for grabs. We shall have to proceed in a more cautious and more
piecemeal manner. As Wittgenstein might say, we must ‘look and see.’”). Accordingly, she
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tension (it is hard to see how one can indulge a theorized “ideal,” which almost by
definition does not exist in any practical reality, while disavowing acontextual
theory), the latter sense at least is consistent with the traditional pragmatic sense that
theory and practice cannot be separated. Apparently, theory exists and is both
meaningful and useful, but only as it is employed in action.44 As a consequence of
this need for context the pragmatist appears to distrust “dichotomies” generally,45
and in a powerful earlier piece on the pragmatic consequences for the “rule of law,”
Radin explained that rules have no existence independent of their application.
Accordingly, while they may exist, rules cannot be stated in the abstract. As she
says, “there can . . . be no radical distinction between a rule and the particulars
falling under it.”46 Accordingly, legal distinctions, like other rules, are essentially
socially infused and essentially mutable.47 Importantly, though, Radin has said that
the pragmatist must avoid the “radical particularism” that might follow from this
demand for context, and which leads to a “kind of nominalist intuitionism”—that is,
the view that rules do not exist at all and that every question must be answered only
on case-specific intuition.48 She says that cannot be right—because she “doubt[s]

frequently says that questions “are undecidable in the abstract.” Margaret Jane Radin, On
Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 430 (1995) (continuing: “[Arguments] have
to be weighed in practice, with respect to specifics”).
44

This seems consistent both with the views of the classical pragmatists and with those of
most legal scholars who take pragmatism seriously. See, e.g., Sullivan & Solove, supra note
18, at 700-01 (arguing that pragmatism should reject any “dualism” between theory and
practice, and should strive to “make practice more intelligent and more critical, in part by
recognizing its theoretical dimension”).
45

See Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical
Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1032 (1991) (“[W]e attack as untenable certain
dicohotomies, on which th[e] jurisprudence [of autonomous doctrine] rears itself: for
example, >following= vs. >making= law, or Rule of Law vs. personal rule”); Radin, Pragmatist
and Feminist, supra note 18, at 1707-08 (“Another pragmatist commitment . . . is the
dissolution of traditional dichotomies. Pragmatists . . . have rejected the dichotomy between
thought and action, or between theory and practice. John Dewey especially made this his
theme; and he also rejected the dichotomies of reason and feeling, mind and body, nature and
nurture, connection and separation, and means and ends”); Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 43,
at 801 n.74 (arguing that her interpretation of Wittgenstein “is implicit in the views of many . .
. modern critics of foundationalism and the traditional dichotomies of fact and value, theory
and practice and the like,” including, by implication, “the modern wave of pragmatism”).
46

Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 43, at 808; see also id. at 814 (noting that her pragmatic
vision “would deny that law consists quintessentially of rules at all, as well as the notion that
rules are separate from cases and logically pre-exist their application”).
47

See Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 43, at 807-09.

48

Radin & Michelman, supra note 45, at 1046. As they say:
The nonideal pragmatist, awash in formalist/legalist culture, too lazily thinks that since
rules can=t possibly be what that culture says rules have to be in order to be any good
at all—that is, fact-independently and precontextually operative—then we had better
keep away from rules altogether. From rejection of the formalist conception of
rulesness, the nonideal pragmatist may leap (unpragmatically) to the conclusion that
all notions of ruleness are misleading, all pretenses of rulesness misdirected. In other
words, she may try to practice the rule that case-by-case judgment, situated
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that unaided radical particularism can accomplish much good for human beings.”49
Therefore, while Radin is highly circumspect concerning abstractions in general, and
she believes that “there is no shared conception that cannot be deconstructed,” for
practical and political reasons she believes in a “need provisionally to take for
granted (>bracket=) certain conceptions in order to make others problematic.”50 This
would seem to follow from her general admonition that the unattainability of ideal
theory should not frustrate our efforts to work within our non-ideal circumstances;
she chooses not to allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good.51
From these generalizations can be pieced together a general stance toward legal
distinctions, including presumably the public-private distinction. First of all,
Professor Radin is suspicious of them to a degree: all generalizations are suspect in
the abstract, and even in practice they are unpredictable, as living, evolving and
socially contingent things. Moreover, she seems to believe that doctrinal distinctions
inevitably will be normatively charged, and therefore (one imagines) she would
admit that they are by their nature potentially problematic, both sociologically and
politically. However, they remain heuristically useful, and indeed her pragmatism
seems to compel that this and other imperfect pre-existing frameworks be preserved
as useful human tools despite their imperfections.52 Moreover, comfort with a
simultaneously “factual” and normative inquiry seems a basic implication of her
pragmatism,53 one corollary of which being that we “must dissolve the dichotomy of
fact and value.”54 Accordingly, while she has been an adept and perceptive critic of
decisionmaking moment by moment, describes all there is and can be to practical,
active intelligence.
Id.
49

Radin & Michelman, supra note 45, at 1047. Indeed, as Sullivan and Solove point out,
pragmatism without some concern for abstractions or “theory”—like that of Richard Posner,
which it was their purpose to criticize—can lead to a Burkean conservatism. If pragmatism
means merely a commitment to reasonableness or common sense, with a rejection of “theory”
and a commitment to case-by-case action to the exclusion of all other evaluation, then it is
difficult to know how ever to evaluate larger institutions or traditions. Especially if the wouldbe pragmatist then concludes that traditions in and of themselves deserve some pragmatic
respect by virtue of their very antiquity, then pragmatism is a prescription for ossification and
is “conservative” by definition. See Sullivan & Solove, supra note 18, at 702, 713-15.
50

Radin, Transformative, supra note 19, at 421.

51

See Margaret Jane Radin, Positive Theory as Conceptual Critique: A Piece of a
Pragmatist Agenda?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1595, 1599 (1995) (urging that Deweyan pragmatists
“should work on both nonideal and ideal programs at once”) [hereinafter Radin, Positive
Theory]; Radin, Reconsidering Personhood, supra note 43, at 425 (“As a pragmatist, I believe
nonideal theory is also necessary. . . . I believe our visions about the nature of human beings
and the nature of the good life for human beings cannot be too far divorced from the
circumstances that give rise to those visions . . . ”).
52

See Radin & Michelman, supra note 45, at 1032 (“Pragmatically successful critique does
not necessarily mean that practitioners give up use of [some problematic intellectual]
framework. It may mean, rather, that they watch out and correct for biases to which the
culturally situated framework is prone”).
53

See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.

54

Radin, Reconsidering Personhood, supra note 43, at 434. As she says, “[f]inding out
about the essentials of ourselves and what is a good life for us is simultaneously an empirical
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important doctrinal distinctions, particularly in her more recent technology-andsociety oriented work,55 as a more general matter she takes our status quo
institutional apparatus of judging and law-applying, with its dependence on abstract,
metaphysical distinctions as a tolerable and apparently indispensable aspect of our
“non-ideal circumstances.”
In any case, then, Radin is surely neither monist nor legal nominalist. That is,
while her position is a subtle and pragmatic one, she is no thorough-going skeptic of
legal distinctions as such. Rather, it appears we should make use of doctrinal
distinctions to whatever extent they are useful, a question that must be asked on a
context-specific basis. She believes ultimately that by employing “local, working
separation[s]” between things, despite whatever problems those distinctions may
have, we might be able to achieve “appreciably consistent and purposive rule
application.”56
B. Radin on Public-Private
As for the public-private problem itself, I believe it can be found throughout
Radin=s work. Though muted, it is evident in an important way in the paper around
which this Symposium is arranged. However, it will be profitable first to consider
the several other, usually more explicit ways it has arisen in her writing.
Her most nearly explicit grappling with it is in her work on the seemingly lawlike aspects of contracting and licensing practices and on the law-like nature of some
technological phenomena.57 The distinction is all but explicitly invoked in her
consideration of the seemingly inappropriate or politically undesirable conversion of
persons or commercial business organizations into de facto regulatory authorities.
This happens when one party in a commercial transaction uses its power over a
product—arising perhaps from market power associated with network effects or the
and normative inquiry.” Id. The quoted language was actually Radin=s characterization of the
views of Martha Nussbaum, but later in the piece Radin noted that her aim was to show
“similarities in methodology” between Nussbaum=s work and her own, one of which being the
“rejection of the fact/value dichotomy . . . .” Id. at 444.
55
For example, in high technology contexts it is hard to know the difference between
“text” and “machine,” see Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 17, or between
“contract” and “product,” see Radin, Humans, Computers, supra note 17.
56

Radin & Michelman, supra note 45, at 1032.
Though it is not directly to the point here, more problematic is her curious, apparently
instinctive preference, very common among today=s legal scholars, for policy solutions that
take the via media or the third way. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The
Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1295, 1298 (“We ought to be talking about the details of good mixtures [of “public” and
“private” regulation] rather than debating top-down >versus= bottom-up”). Though that instinct
bears a certain affinity to her pragmatism, it ultimately and I think irrationally implies the
artificial desideratum of compromise, which draws suasion only from the questionable fact
that it seems reasonable to listen to both sides. Perhaps I=ve misunderstood, but I do not
understand compromise for its own sake to be “pragmatic.” Radin herself sometimes seems to
acknowledge as much. See, e.g., Radin, Transformative, supra note 19, at 415 (“I would agree
that sometimes [progressive scholars, including Radin] are too ready to see consensus”).
57

These things have been of concern to a number scholars. See sources cited supra note

16.
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leveraging of intellectual property—to dictate terms upon the other, who is
dependent on that product.58 As she says, such situations can result effectively in
“private eminent domain” insofar as they lead to “changes of position imposed on
one private party by another . . . ”59 Not only does that situation give a nominally
private party power over another, it even allows him to usurp the state itself—he may
“privatize information that the intellectual property regimes place in the public
domain . . . ”60 Sometimes in these materials Radin comes tantalizing close to doing
away with the distinction altogether.61

58

It seems hard to deny that this occurs at least sometimes in reality, and it can arise in
peculiar and unforseen ways. For example, in her casebook Radin relates the well known
story of the “MAPS RBL”—the Mail Abuse Prevention System Realtime Blackhole List.
MAPS, a non-profit advocacy organization dedicated to opposing “spam” email, began what
has become an influential campaign to curb spam by maintaining a list—the RBL—of
websites known to send spam and web hosts that provide “spam support services” to their
clients. The RBL is then used by ISPs as a list of offenders to include in their “spam filters.”
Inclusion on the list is therefore commercially very undesirable to web-hosting services and
other service providers—their commercial clients value them more highly if the clients=
presence on their service won=t render them subject to spam filters. Accordingly, MAPS, a
privately organized California LLC, has a fair bit of power to encourage compliance with its
basic standards against “spam support services” and other behaviors it believes promote spam.
MAPS therefore has come to hold significant power that seems indistinguishable from
traditionally conceived “government” regulatory power. See RADIN ET AL., supra note 17, at
28-32; MAPS homepage, http://www.mail-abuse.com/; see also Media3 Technologies, Inc. v.
MAPS, LLC, 2001 WL 92389 (D. Mass. 2001) (denying preliminary injunction to RBL-listed
web-host on any of its claims of defamation, tortious interference or statutory unfair trade
practice); MAPS, LLC v. Black Ice Software, Inc., 2000 WL 34016435 (Sup. Ct. Calif., Santa
Clara Co. 2000) (allowing a variety of causes of action to proceed against MAPS).
The point here, however, will not be that it does not happen—indeed, I think the
phenomenon is omnipresent not just in technology sectors but everywhere—but that there is
no meaningful difference between this sort of “private regulatory” phenomenon and the whole
other world of examples of social influence arising from circumstances.
59

Radin, Humans, Computers, supra note 17, at 1127-28.

60

Id. at 1145; see also Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 17, at 5 (mass software
contracts “replace the law of the state with the >law= of the company”).
61

For example, in one article she analyzed the imposition of mass contracts by powerful
sellers on buyers who are either weaker or are simply unaware of the contract terms to which
they are being bound. (Though she had in mind software licensing contracts, she notes that
the situation is not really different than in mass contracts in retail marketing generally.) The
problem in such cases, as she characterizes it, is the “puzzle of binding commitment in
situations of >contract without consent.’” Radin, Humans, Computers, supra note 17, at 115556. She said—“pragmatically,” one presumes—that this problem should be approached by
asking “whether we justify party A=s rearranging the entitlements of party B (or a large
number of party B=s) on any basis other than consent.” Id. at 1156.
But this only makes the absurdity of the distinction glaringly obvious, and her observation
would amount to a very perceptive social critique if she had intended it that way. The
situation of “party A=s rearranging the entitlements of . . . a large number of party B=s
[without] consent” is a plausible model of “government” regulation, and therefore to say that
some seemingly “private” entity performs an indistinguishable function is in itself a trenchant
critique of any claim that there is a meaningful distinction between public and private.
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Likewise, Radin has in several places explicitly made the same observation that a
number of the legal realists did, following the insight of Wesley Hohfeld: the realm
of social ordering we think of as the “private” one of commercial relationships is
infused with a public character, insofar as property and contract are creatures of the
state. The background of rights against which private ordering is reached is fixed by
the state and reflects non-neutral value allocations. Those allocations preference
some interests over others.62
Concern for the distinction is also very clearly evident in her work on the “rule of
law,” a project from many years ago that was not much followed up on but that was
important in the development of her overall pragmatism. The distinction is
implicated there because the model of rules she says is required within in any
coherently pragmatic rule of law is one in which “law” is literally made only when
legal rules are followed; rules do not even exist except as they are followed in
practice by people. Such a model implies a radically revised picture of the role of
sovereign entities in making “law,” and of the vision that a defining character of law
Radin very briefly addresses the distinction in one other place, though she appears to have
raised it as a more or less offhand rhetorical point rather than a serious analytical argument. In
discussing how we should feel about the apparently increasing incidence of mass online
contracts imposed with no evidence of consumer consent, she suggests that a central problem
is how to “justify” their enforceability according to the traditional rationale of mutual consent.
“We could . . . make the problem go away,” she says, “by attenuating what we mean by
‘private party.’” Radin, Humans, Computers, supra note 17, at 1128. She evidently means we
could imagine reconceiving commercial entities with de facto regulatory influence as part of
the “state” or as having a claim to legitimacy equivalent to that of the state. Following that,
“‘private’ eminent domain [might] be no less and no more justified than ‘public.’” She
doesn’t think this will work, however; she does “not believe our ordinary understandings on
these matters will change quickly enough to avoid the problem [of justification].” Id.
62

See Radin & Wagner, supra note 56, at 1295-96 (noting arguments that then-emerging
“cyberspace” would come to be “privately” ordered, an arrangement said to be superior to
government regulation; arguing, however, that such “private” ordering would simply reflect
government policy, and explicitly relating this critique to that of the realists); see also Radin,
Humans, Computers, supra note 17, at 1155 (“I accept the legal realist argument that when the
institutions of property and contract take the form of a legal infrastructure, structured and
policed by the state, there can be no such thing as a purely >private= ordering”).
As mentioned, this is a Hohfeldian insight. Though he may not have intended it, many of
the Realists appear to have found the initial inspiration for their critique in the property law
theory of Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld, a Yale law professor of the early 20th century, set out to
study only property relationships. He began by observing that “property” is not a relation
between a human and an object, but between one human and other humans vis-a-vis an object.
As a corollary, he argued that every property “right” implies a countervailing “duty” (e.g., the
right of exclusion from real property entails the “duty” not to trespass). In other words, every
exercise of a property right necessarily limits some person=s countervailing freedom. See
generally FRIED, supra note 15, at 51-54.
The real problem is that there is no logical stopping point for this critique. From this
perspective every right necessarily limits countervailing freedoms. See id. at 173-74
(discussing the logical end-point of the Hohfeld-inspired Progressive critique of “rights”). As
Professor Fried observes, this was presaged in Holmes= idea that “even the prohibition on
battery, the most apparently nonredistributive of all legal rules, sacrificed the would-be
batterer=s >gratification of ill-will= to the other side=s right to be free from pain” FRIED, supra
note 15, at 53. Holmes expressed this view in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice
and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894); see FRIED, supra note 15, at 103-04 & nn.164-65.
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itself is its origin in “public” acts. Moreover, if the following of a “rule” makes it a
“rule” and is a significant component in the make-up of “law,” then the following of
law-like norms promulgated by non-state actors must blur the line between “law”
and “non-law” and therefore between public and private. As she says, “[i]n the
pragmatic view a rule will be [sufficiently known to the] public whenever strong
social agreement exists in practice, regardless of whether a legislature or a court has
spoken.”63 The making of “law”—a quintessentially “public” act—is always a
collaborative project in which actors in the “private” sphere are always participants.
Indeed, she goes so far as to say that “[i]f we accept the Wittgensteinian view of
rules [as our model of law], . . . we must reject . . . [the] distinction between
government as rule-maker and citizens as rule-followers.”64
That leads finally to the least obvious question, which is how the distinction
plays a role in Professor Radin=s paper in this Symposium, but I think the answer is
in many ways the most telling of all. In the main her paper urges a change in the
general approach of courts to property rights questions in the “digital
environment.”65 It works through a series of miscellaneous controversies in recent
litigation concerning technology issues, its thrust being that most of the decisions
and rhetoric so far have tended to increase the scope of individual ownership in
information.66 This caselaw is often transparently motivated by misleading “new
economy” rhetoric and imagery,67 and sometimes driven by bizarre metaphysics, as
courts try to conceptualize new technologies as legal objects.68 Stressing the
“evolutionary and contested character” of property rights in general, Radin urges that
recent property trends in the digital environment be reconsidered in light of a variety
of policies in addition to property values. She introduces a deliberately physico63

Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 43, at 815.

64

Id. at 815-16.

65

See Radin, Comment, supra note 3, at 23.

66

That concern has been common enough among those writing about the social
consequences of high technology. See, e.g., sources cited in note 16, supra.
67

Surrounding which, after all, is a certain cautionary history; the rhetoric of the “new” has
been a frequently and cyclically misleading phenomenon. One wishes probably in vain that
we might someday all learn to stop forgetting our own past. See, e.g., CHARLES P.
KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES (4th ed. 2000); CHARLES MACKAY,
EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (1841). In particular,
there is a bit of cottage industry in professional critique of New Economy mythology. See,
e.g., JEAN GADREY, NEW ECONOMY, NEW MYTH (2003); Robert J. Gordon, Does the “New
Economy” Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (2000).
68
Notably, as Radin observes, several courts have analogized the sending of unwanted
electronic messages to physical trespasses, and accordingly have relied on common law
trespass doctrines in deciding whether those messages are actionable in some way. To do so,
however, they have relied on the strained view that the receipt of those messages was a
physical intrusion because they caused plaintiffs’ computers to receive contact with unwanted
electrons.
This is probably among the most criticized of current doctrines relating to high technology
phenomena. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 527-28
& n.24 (2003) (setting out conceptual problems in the doctrine, and collecting a long series of
journal articles critical of it).
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spatial metaphor by which to think about these issues, which she says will lead
courts more carefully to consider non-property policy concerns, which are like
“neighbors” and are adjacent to property policy in its “neighborhood.”69 While
admitting this is potentially problematic and can be taken too far,70 she says “[t]he
propertization neighborhood should always be aware of its function within the city as
a whole.”71 Ultimately, she suggests that the courts will outgrow this initial period of
“over-focus on propertization,”72 perhaps along with our society=s waning conviction
in the eschatological significance of the allegedly “new economy,” but even so, in
the meantime she thinks a broader-based consideration of all the affected
“neighboring” policies would serve society well and would produce decisions that
are “better reasoned.”
I think intentionally or not in this paper she lets slip something that makes the
problem of the public private distinction very apparent. One of the many
miscellaneous doctrinal problems she considers in the course of the essay,
consideration of which she says would be improved through her “neighborhood”
metaphor, is corporate limitation of incoming email communications. She asks,
“[s]hould a corporation=s property right be expanded to include censorship of
incoming email to employees?”73 Tellingly, though she thinks the most important
69
This “[l]egal milieu,” in which information property decisions should be made, “refers to
surrounding legal arenas of thought and political struggle that have bearing on the one we are
considering” Radin, Comment, supra note 3, at 27. Radin believes that a few “surrounding . .
. arenas” in particular have been neglected. Property values themselves serve important
interests, as she admits; allocation of property rights is thought to be fundamental to the
functioning of healthy markets. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property
Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16 (1973). But other important values are the impact of
over-propertization on free speech and competition B she desires the courts “to be as explicit
as would be ideal with regard to the neighboring realms of contractual ordering, competition
policy, and free speech policy.” Radin, Comment, supra note 3, at 34. As becomes clear in
the course of her piece, Radin believes these information-propertization cases would be better
decided if they were decided more like real property cases, in which explicit consideration of
values other than the interests of the individual owner—namely, competition values, free
speech values, and contract ordering—has tended to produce property less concentrated in the
“owner” and more conscious of social values. Keeping this metaphor in mind, she says, will
produce propertization decisions that are “better reasoned.”
70
See, e.g., Radin, Comment, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that her approach “is a heuristic
suggestion, which I am proposing in order to try to improve our reasoning about these matters.
. . . It is a metaphor, and metaphors should not be pushed too far”). Others have observed that
physico-spatial metaphors have in fact produced bad judicial decisions, and should be used
only cautiously. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 68 (criticizing the “cyberspatial” metaphor,
which conceives of “cyberspace” as being genuinely a “place” to which courts could
appropriately apply doctrines designed with real property in mind; accepting, however, that
the metaphor is probably already ingrained in culture and judicial practice, and that it has led
to some bad legal outcomes, but suggesting ways that the metaphor can be used with
sensitivity to the special distinctions of online communication).
71

Radin, Comment, supra note 3, at 23.

72

See id. at 39.

73

Id. at 37. Specifically, she discusses a California state court litigation that culminated in
Intel v. Hamidi, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1342 (Cal. 2003), which considered whether the Intel
corporation could seek to enjoin a former employee from sending mass emails to Intel=s
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“neighbor” in this case is free speech values, and though she thinks their propriety
should depend on considerations just like those used in Speech Clause cases,74 she
does not encourage a return to the regime of Shelley v. Kramer.75 She notes that
“[t]he days of expansive state-action doctrine are no longer with us . . . .”76 But that
is precisely the point—why not return to Shelley if the argument is that some
nominally “private” entity would be treated better if it is treated like the state? Why
care about formalistic legal distinctions if both the policy problem and the desired
approach to it are the same?
Indeed, on a little further consideration it becomes clear that this same
transformation, this same sense in which excessive social control is deposited in
“private” hands through the process of “propertization,” runs throughout the essay.
It seems that what Radin really desires, in all sorts of “propertization” scenarios, is
for the holders of propertized values to be constrained in ways that protect the
autonomy and social liberties of comparatively weaker persons. While I expect she
would say this is not her real meaning, I think the logical conclusion to be drawn
from her essay is that, according to her reasoning, private property holders should be
held to constraints like those that bind the state B that is, they should be subject to
norms essentially like those embodied in our public law, and that result is itself one
possible consequence of dissolution of the public-private distinction. So why not
just give up on it?
The pragmatist has a very general response to this sort of question, but I will
address that below77; in the meantime, Professor Radin has offered certain specific
thoughts about this particular distinction that are worth discussing. She has
current employees. Intel could not show any physical damage to its system, though it sought
to enjoin the emails as “trespass” to its system, and rather argued only that the content of the
messages was harmful. The California Supreme Court ultimately denied Intel=s request,
arguing that the “trespass to chattels” doctrine should not be extended as far as Intel desired B
namely, to reach conduct that causes no physical harm to the plaintiff=s computer system.
74

She would like to see explicit judicial consideration of how the corporation=s “property”
interests in its communications system affect the free speech interests of the corporation=s
employees and third parties; she would even like to see concern for whether different results
should obtain depending on whether the interdiction is “selective and content-based.” See
Radin, Comment, supra note 3, at 38.
As mentioned, the California Supreme Court reached the result Radin apparently prefers.
She disagrees with the decision, however, because it failed to take her “neighborhood”
approach B the Court did not consider the “neighboring” policies in its decision, including
most importantly free speech policy. See id. at 37. As she says, “in the future, a corporation
that wants to enjoin e-mail whose content it does not like will have to show that its computer
system was somehow harmed. What sense does it make to sidestep in this way the issues of
free speech policy and competition policy raised by this kind of conflict?” Id.
75
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (prohibiting enforcement of restrictive covenants against sale of
residential homes to non-whites; finding “state action” requisite to plaintiff=s '1983 action in
judicial enforcement of the covenants).
76

Radin, Comment, supra note 3, at 37.

77

Namely, that we should hold on to even problematic legal rules, both because they might
have some value some times and because doing away with such a fundamental concept as this
one is unrealistic. I think in this case that general response is not availing; see infra notes 8185 and accompanying text.
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sometimes spoken of it disparagingly, though not apparently because she thinks it is
inaccurate sociologically or morally.78 She has suggested that the distinction is both
useful in policy making and, despite acknowledging its penumbral difficulties, thinks
it is reasonably administrable by lawyers in some heuristic, Wittgensteinian sort of
way.79 This sort of approach follows from the general pragmatic model of legal rules
discussed above; she thinks that because most public-private problems are in the core
and only rarely in the penumbra, we can take the distinction as one that “[w]e all
think [of as] self-evident.” Rules of such a nature have some significant
meaningfulness because they are taken to be obvious. “[S]omeone who doesn=t see”
a result that is within the core to be “self-evident” will be “considered insane or from
Mars . . . . ”80
III. TAKING THE DISTINCTION HEAD-ON
In a way, Prof. Radin has an easy response to any general critique of the publicprivate distinction, either in her work or in law generally, and it is important to face
it up front. She could say that, as a pragmatist, she actually makes no generalizations
of her own and that, unless the critique is contextualized with some case-specific
details, she cannot be called to say whether the distinction is good or not. The
pragmatist might say that any critique I could give is itself a generalizing one and
with lack of case-specific context it is hopelessly beyond evaluation and therefore
that it proves nothing.81 A separate but related response is that even if we could
78

As she once said:
I do not need to recapitulate here all the critiques from the right and the left, including
some of my own, that undermine the public/private distinction. When all the
undermining is done, though, where are we? Have we reached a point where we can
consider the social benefit of systems of unconsented-to-contracts imposed by private
parties in the very same way we consider the social benefit of statutory provisions
imposed by a legislature?
Radin, Humans, Computers, supra note 17, at 1160. That question was evidently rhetorical
(the answer being “no”), and the paper otherwise took the distinction more or less for granted.
79

She has said this:
I am a pragmatist about the public/private distinction, meaning that in my view it is
not a conceptual or formal distinction, an either/or that is easy to deconstruct, but
rather a contextual characterization that tends to work in practice most of the time.
Most of the time, that is, what is public and what is private has been capable of being
sorted out in a way that is functionally understood, in spite of the difficult borderline
cases.
Margaret Jane Radin, Machine Rule: The Latest Challenge to Law 2 (manuscript on file with
author).
80

Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 43, at 802.

81

She made a related response to a previous critic, which I think is a very good argument
and deserves an answer:
The pragmatist will readily grant that someone should work on ideal theory. But why
must it be the same person as the one who tries to chart the consequences of
alternative courses in light of the complexities [of our existing issues and problems]?
To suppose that all the work must be done by one person is to deny that a partial
contribution can be a useful contribution. As a pragmatist I tend to think on the
contrary that all contributions are partial. The experience of writers as part of an
ongoing dialogue seems to bear me out.
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simply dispose of a well-settled distinction like this one, which she doubts, we
(meaning Radin and those who share her political perspective) should not do so
because it may be of strategic advantage to us in advancing our own political goals.82
Despite my own lack of faith in theoretical generalization,83 I think there are
several reasons Professor Radin should still take the following analysis seriously.
First, this analysis could be read as a critique of a “bad coherence” in her
pragmatism.84 To the extent the pragmatist is generally open to the distinction or
approaches it as a common-sense tool in need only of case-by-case judicial tinkering,
or as a tool of use to the pragmatist=s personal political strategy, then I think she is
open to a kind of generalizing critique that Radin has said she finds permissible
sometimes. Namely, if the public-private distinction is accepted by the pragmatist as
“coherent,” it is a coherence of a merely “institutional” kind, and therefore that it is
open to categorical rejection; she once made a similar argument about racism and
sexism.85 Second, to the extent the pragmatist demands a case-specific rather than
generalized critique, the following analysis will largely provide it—to really
carefully consider the distinction in action is to see just how often it produces results
Radin, Transformative, supra note 19, at 414. I hope my answer to this point will be evident
from what follows.
82
She made this point in responding to a previous critic, who alleged that her pragmatic
refusal to abandon existing legal rules was inherently conservative. She said that, rather than
deconstruct every concept, pragmatists should “use [existing political] ideology for our own
political gain.” Radin, Transformative, supra note 19, at 416. Moreover, she implied that
some ideas cannot be dislodged even if it would be good to do so, and specifically that she
“do[es] not think . . . that the ideology of private property can be dislodged.” Radin,
Transformative, supra note 19, at 417. Therefore, she thinks that the better course for “our . . .
political gain” would be to adopt a “strategy of assimilating more rights into property.” Radin,
Transformative, supra note 19, at 417 n.28. Presumably she would doubt that the deeper and
allied concept of the public-private distinction could realistically be challenged in and of itself,
and therefore that the better course would be to use it strategically for political gain.
83
See Chris Sagers, Waiting With Brother Thomas, 46 UCLA L. REV. 461, 469-75 (1998)
(noting consequences for “theory” of skeptical epistemology).
84

The “bad coherence” problem is the tendency, arguably inherent in pragmatism, to
conserve “bad” ideas. As Radin has explained, the pragmatist (on her view) follows a
“coherence” theory of truth. In a nutshell, this means that the pragmatist, “when . . . faced
with new experiences and new beliefs, [will] fit them into [her] web [of existing beliefs] with
as little alteration of what is already there as possible” Radin, Pragmatist and Feminist, supra
note 18, at 1708-09. To illustrate, she quotes W.V.O. Quine: “our statements about the
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate
body.” Id. at 1708 n.26 (quoting W. V. O. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A
LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20, 42 (2d ed. 1980)).
As she acknowledges, however, this position has given rise to the criticism of “bad
coherence.” Namely, whatever logical suasion the “coherence” position may hold, it is
possible that the pragmatist=s existing “corporate body” of beliefs includes morally bad or
undesirable ones, and the refusal to reconsider them solely because challenges to them seem
“incoherent” might be a politically conservative (and, I would add, patently, painfully
obviously logically fallacious) position. See id. at 1710.
85
That is, even while adhering to a coherence theory of truth we can observe that
coherence requires fealty to existing concepts, not institutions. See Radin, Pragmatist and
Feminist, supra note 18, at 1720-21.
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in drastic contradiction to our political commitments, even though its odd effects can
be hard to see. Likewise, if you think about it, the pragmatic demand for context
really just calls on the pragmatist to offer situations in which the public-private
distinction works well. It turns out that they are much harder to come by than the
pragmatist might think. In any case, even if the pragmatist believes none of this, the
following critique can at least be taken as an argument about “ideal theory” of the
kind Radin has often said is important even to the pragmatist.
I believe the distinction has no content as either a moral or a sociological
proposition. While I will work through case-specific examples, as the pragmatist
would presumably insist, the central thrust of my critique is this: Fundamentally
regulatory power, arising from bilateral power asymmetry, is everywhere. A
consequence of this basic observation will be that very difficult (indeed, I believe
undecideable) questions of public-versus-private are routine, everyday affairs that
are of crucial significance to the lives of real human beings.86 I believe the
pragmatist is simply mistaken if she suggests (as Radin, most lawyers, and virtually
all judges and lawmakers do) that most cases posed under the distinction are “core
cases,” and that, except in rare cases at the periphery, the distinction can be easily
deployed on some heuristic basis. In fact, however rarely it may be acknowledged,
the distinction routinely defies common experience and examples are without
number in which it causes there to be different legal treatment of entities that seem
substantively similar or identical.
Thus, private universities are not subject to constitutional and administrative law,
but public ones are. Religious institutions very literally regulate both their clergy
and their parishioners, but are treated in law and theory very differently than
governments. Standard setting bodies and trade organizations, which are absolutely
ubiquitous in contemporary society, directly regulate and issue opinions that have
great influence, but they are generally treated as not only not the government but in
fact essentially the same as private individuals.87
In terms of quantifiable impact on the lives of individuals, probably the most
important example is that large corporations might as well be governments in much
of their decisionmaking, but for most legal purposes they are treated nearly as if they
were individual human beings. As political scientist Mark Nadel observed, there is
little of satisfying substance in a distinction under which decisions made by
American auto manufacturers not to employ low-cost safety technology, despite
evidence that it would save many thousands of lives annually, are said to be
importantly distinct from a federal decision shortly thereafter to require those same
measures, on the basis of the same evidence.88 More to the point here, it is not clear
86

As I have written elsewhere more extensively. See Sagers, Myth, supra note 13.

87

See Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations: A
Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393 (2004) [hereinafter
Sagers, Antitrust Immunity] (discussing factual background of standard setting organizations
and their treatment under law).
88

See Mark V. Nadel, The Hidden Dimension of Public Policy: Private Governments and
the Policy-Making Process, 37 J. POL. 2 (1975). As Nadel says, “[w]hen we say that a
member of the school board in Sheboygan, Wisconsin, is part of >the authorities= but the
president of General Motors is not, we cannot go very far in understanding political behavior
or public policy” Id. at 19. Cf. Kurt L. Hanslowe, Regulation by Visible Public and Invisible
Private Government, 40 TEX. L. REV. 88, 130 (1961) (“[I]t is plain that substantial proportions
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why a manufacturing design decision rendered by a massive “private” corporation
(or, really, any other generalized decision by such an entity), posing large
consequences for individuals, is meaningfully different than the kinds of transactions
about which Radin has written recently, which she implies are problematic in that
they resemble “public” actions but are not subject to public law norms. Why are any
broad choices by major corporations really different than “shrink-wrap” or “clickwrap” software licensing programs? Why are they so different than technological
innovations that have the effect of limiting rights that persons otherwise would have?
Why are they so different than the MAPS Realtime Blackhole List?89
Thus, hard and highly debatable public-private questions are daily, ubiquitous,
and hugely important to the lives of individuals. The distinction simply is not a coreand-penumbra phenomenon.
Generalizing, non-pragmatic defenses of the distinction can be made, but they are
not at all compelling. Most legal academics are not much impressed by the
formalistic, institutional positivism that drives the distinction in judicial practice.
Though it surely explains the approach of practicing lawyers and judges, it is neither
very morally nor sociologically compelling to say that some consequence is not the
work of a “private” person because it was “caused” by some action of an entity that
is formally constituted as part of the “government.” As just a few examples,
consider the standard setting body composed of industry representatives whose
product standard is adopted by state and local governments through an unreflective
rubber-stamp,90 or the NCAA, a nominally “private” non-profit association whose
members include many state universities and which wields significant regulatory
power over them.91 Legal academics are therefore usually sympathetic to more
nuanced explanations, but I believe those too are really no more convincing than the
most formalistic positivism. I don=t believe the solution can be that “state” authority
is backed by “legitimate coercion” or even that the state has a monopoly on
“legitimate violence,” because there is such a range of easy counter-examples.92
Likewise, it is not because submission to “private” authority is merely “voluntary,” a
seemingly thoughtful solution until one remembers it is the same as the logic in

of economic activity are presently not governed by rules that come anywhere near
approximating the power-neutralizing, classical, atomistically individualistic, liberal,
competitive model”)
89

See supra note 58.

90
See Sagers, Antitrust Immunity, supra note 87, at 1398-1402 (discussing the great
frequency of this sort of “incorporation by reference”).
91

See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (refusing to consider NCAA “state actor”
for purposes of '1983 procedural due process suit brought by state-university employee
disciplined under NCAA pressure).
92

First, many nominally “private” organizations wield extensive power that is “legitimate”
in our predominant discourse. A wide array of nominally private associations can impose
fines, expulsion, and other sanctions. Obvious examples include religious excommunication,
expulsion from a trade group for violation of membership or conduct rules, denial of licensure
or certification, or money penalties. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Second, many
“government” actions are backed by sanctions not including violent coercion. We do not
imagine SEC penalties not to be “law” because they are not punishable by death.
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Lochner. In reality, subjection to much “state” authority is voluntary whereas
subjection to much “private” authority, really, is not.93
Indeed, it turns out that the only sense in which the distinction really has any
appeal is that it works to some extent as a Holmesian bad-man prediction of what
courts will do,94 and it is not even especially good at that.95 Ultimately, as I have
been implying throughout this essay, the public-private distinction is merely a
normative commitment that happens to appear as an identification of pre-existing
nature. Therein is both an explanation of its weakness as a sociological instrument B
it would be only a coincidence if reality matched up with any particular group=s
political desiderata B and its moral ugliness B because it is in fact a reflection of a
particular political vision, it therefore disadvantages other visions. Indeed, it is the
reason why pragmatically cautious refusal to jettison the distinction is a problem of
“bad coherence”: invocation of the distinction as a non-arbitrary reflection of preexisting nature works violence in the everyday lives of people.96
I think Professor Radin=s work in particular would benefit from a more explicit
and generalizing reconsideration of this issue because, frankly, it raises problems that
seem to have been central to her throughout her career. Her abiding project, it seems
to me, has always been a humane one: her work surrounds a commitment to what

93

At least in our society, subjection to many forms of state authority is quite voluntary, and
subjection to many forms of non-state authority is only “voluntary” in the same formal sense
as was implied in liberty of contract caselaw. “Certainly,” says Frank Snyder, in a very
thoughtful article,
the State is an association that is more difficult to exit than, for example, the Sierra
Club or a bowling league, but so is a family, a church, or the market economy. Most
State associations are, in fact, voluntary, even for those who reside within the State. I
have no obligation to join the Coast Guard or work for the State of California. If I do
not like the Forth Worth City Council, I can move to Arlington. If I do not choose to
be a Texan, I can move to New Jersey. If I decide I no longer want to be an American,
I can go to France or, if I prefer someplace lacking any resemblance to a State,
Somalia.
Snyder, supra note 10, at 378.
94

See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459, 461 (1897) (“If
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man . . . . [Under that
perspective, the ‘law’ is] [t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious . . . ”).
95

For example, courts sometimes give significant weight to the government-like acts of
private entities. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in
the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV.
1329 (1978) (noting the influence of privately set safety and design standards in tort
litigation).
96

Thus it turns out to be slightly ironic that Professor Radin does not explicitly encourage
a return to “[t]he days of expansive state action doctrine,” as in Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948). Radin, Comment, supra note 3, at 37. Shelley is not, despite popular lawyerly
opinion, just a curiosity or a politicized aberration of little current significance. It was a
culminating moment in the career of Robert Hale, the legal realist whose life=s work lay
largely in arguing that the fundamental purpose of the public-private distinction is to disguise
prior endowments of resources. See FRIED, supra note 15, at 87-88.
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she describes as a Deweyan “democratic ideal,”97 at the core of which is a moral
desideratum for self-attainment of the individual.98 Direct confrontation of the
rhetoric of public-private, in a global and generalizing way, seems of central
significance to this project because, ultimately, all the problems with the distinction
are really problems of power, and the distinction=s tendency to legitimize that power
(indeed to conceal it utterly) is disagreeable precisely because that power
dehumanizes the individual.
For example, no one seriously doubts that an employer has “power” in some
sense over his employees, and few Americans today really question the legitimacy of
that influence. The “legitimacy,” however, arises from the concept of property B and
therefore directly from the public-private divide. That the employer may hire and
fire, and as a consequence set workplace rules, seems appropriate because the
proprietor owns the productive assets at issue and its revenues.99 But indeed, the
proprietor can do so much more:
the proprietor may discipline, impose
institutionalized norms, and socialize workplace behaviors, including whole
attitudes, moralities and personalities, all through exercising the “rights” that flow
ultimately from the assignment of property. The proprietor, in other words, holds
power, of a subtle, extensive, and potentially insidious kind.100 In contemporary
society, the scope of this power has become very broad; most Americans now work
for organizations that employ very large workforces, most of which are nominally
“private.” Accordingly, to a profound degree in current American society there
reside in “private” hands accretions of regulatory power, indistinguishable in my
mind from anything called “government” power except in the rhetoric we use to
explain it.101 By characterizing the coercive potential of property as simply a private
97
Margaret Jane Radin, A Deweyan Perspective on the Economic Theory of Democracy,
11 CONST. COMMENTARY 539, 541 (1994).
98

See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (2001).

99
No doubt the argument could also be made that such a situation will normally be
allocationally efficient, because the assignment of property rights in this case appropriately
aligns incentives. This will also contribute to the sense of “legitimacy,” but is by no means its
only or, I expect, its primary source.
100

This is power in the sense famously theorized by Steven Lukes as the “radical
conception of power,” meaning the ability not only to force a subject to do or not do
something contrary to that person=s desires, but also to influence those very desires
themselves. See STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (2d ed. 2005); Peter Digeser, The
Fourth Face of Power, 54 J. POL. 977, 978-84 (1992) (discussing Lukes= vision and comparing
it to that of Michel Foucault). Foucault expresses a more subtle and recondite understanding
of “power,” based on his view of the “subject” as historically constructed. Its result is a
society in which something called “power” is not so much an intentionally exercised capacity
of one person over another, but a relation in which the participants are both “vehicles” through
which power passes. See id.
Foucault=s argument is compelling and meaningful but I think it would also be distracting
to try to pursue it here; I think my rhetorical point is made well enough by Lukes= instinctively
compelling notion.
101
This fact calls into question much more than the legitimacy of the employer=s property
rights or the sociological accuracy of the public-private distinction. It casts doubt on whether,
at least in today=s society, there even are such things as “markets,” or at any rate markets that
are in any sense “free.” See Sagers, Myth, supra note 13; Herbert A. Simon, Organizations
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right of ownership, the common view renders the employee=s subjection voluntary
and therefore fair. Thus, property and private-ness are themselves agents to
legitimize otherwise contingent and debatable allocations of coercive influence.
Once that ephemeral veil of legitimacy is disregarded, asymmetrical distributions of
truly regulatory power seem to appear everywhere.
A completely different question, however, is what difference this really makes.
That is, one might say that the criticism here is really just semantic: Maybe in
Radin=s work there has already been a full and searching critique of the substance of
maldistributed power, and all she=s failed to do is address the arguably cosmetic
matter of calling this or that source of power “public” or “private” as the case may
be. Maybe labeling it one thing or the other isn=t really that important.
In fact I think the critique here makes a very significant difference, for two quite
different reasons. First, as I have tried to imply, I believe that on a reasonable
reading of her work Radin=s logic leads to quite a radical reconception of social
relations, but the quiet, legitimating rhetoric of public-private has kept her from
considering it. Indeed, I think such a reconceptualization would be painfully obvious
except that the “persistent mythological force of laissez-faire ideology in our
culture”102 makes it so hard to see: the world of non-state organizations in
contemporary society have precisely nothing in common with the individual persons
to whom we analogize them, an illusion we could preserve so long in the face of so
much reason to believe otherwise only because of the public-private distinction.
Worse yet, public-private rhetoric tends to conceal the fact that misallocations of
power are only becoming worse, and perhaps inexorably so. Organizational choices
driven by profit-maximization—which in our liberal capitalism we take largely for
granted as the wholesome by-products of dynamic and allocational efficiencies—
tend ever more greatly to favor centralization to maximize efficiencies in production
and distribution. Weber long ago foresaw this would be the case in his metaphor of
the “iron cage,” but its grim consequences for the individual tend to be obscured by
public-private rhetoric. Therefore, I think the larger work to be done in this area is
not the continued pragmatic tinkering with miscellaneous doctrinal issues or the
exploration of yet more seemingly unique or peculiar factual scenarios. With respect
to power in society—the issue obscured from view by the public-private
distinction—the real work is in large-scale reconceptualization.
The second and quite different reason I think this critique matters is also the only
real criticism I will offer of Radin=s pragmatism as such. Pragmatism, especially in
its concern for retaining even problematic rules for the sake of their potential
political value, tends to turn legal writing into something other than scholarship; it
becomes irreducibly political rhetoric. Maybe the pragmatist will say that this is
unavoidable, and indeed maybe pragmatism itself should be taken as an allencompassing epistemological attack on the very idea of scholarship. Maybe its
central message is that politics is all there really is. But unless one is ready to go that
far then there is something amiss in a view that says we should avoid purely abstract
questions because they don=t have immediate practical application or to do so doesn=t
and Markets, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 25 (1991) (broadly critical of price-theory-driven neoinstitutional economics; noting, among other things, that “Counted by the head, most of the
actors in a modern economy are employees”).
102

Radin & Wagner, supra note 56, at 1295.
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serve our own political objects (as Radin seems occasionally to have argued). There
is something of value in our freedom to indulge very broad critique of the publicprivate distinction, even if the actual disposal of it seems politically implausible and
even if exploiting it might be of political value to the pragmatist herself.
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